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Summary findings
Barba Navaretti and Carraro analyze the determinants of  because it affects the long-term trust between the
interfirm agreements between industrial and developing  partners.
countries for research and development (R&cD)  - that  The empirical analysis is based on a data set of
is, between firms with asymmetric endowments of  international arm's length agreements, part of which
knowledge. They develop a model in which a  involve joint R&D. Testing the two-choice model
multinational has two options:  (1) serting up a subsidiary  supports some of the key theoretical results and
and competing with a local firm in a duopoly, or (2)  assumptions. R&D agreements are particularly  likely to
implementing an agreement and sharing monopoly  emerge when firms are operating in knowledge-intensive
profits. The two firms, if they choose the agreement, may  industries (where nontangible assets, like knowledge, are
also cooperate in R&D.  The model shows that:  large relative to tangible assets), when the partners  have
* The choice of cooperating  in R&D is influenced by  a nonhierarchical  contractual relationship  (they all
the interremporal preferences of the developing country  contribute to the R&D effort), and when technological
firm, the relative efficiency in R&D of the two firms, and  asymmetries between home and host countries (as
the extent of knowledge spillovers.  proxies of knowledge endowments of the contracting
* The choice of cooperating  in R&D increases both  firms) exist but are not too great.
the profitability and stability of the agreement, stability
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Knowledge  is an important  determinant  of the decision  to start production  abroad. Both the
empirical  and the theoretical  literature  emphasise  its role in creating  ownership  advantages.  Indeed,
it is a firm specific intangible  asset, which can be transferred  at a lower  cost than other capital assets
(Horstman and Markusen 1987). At the same time, its nature as a public good influences the
effectiveness  and, consequently,  the form of its transfer. Many recent empirical studies have now
gathered a  quite impressive body of evidence about knowledge spillovers from multinational
activities to host countries'  firms (see Blomstrom  and Kokko, 1996  for a comprehensive  survey of
this literature). Costs of spillovers  influence  the multinationals'  choice of internalised  international
transactions (subsidiaries), versus arm-length ones  (e.g.  licensing) (Ethier  1986, Ethier  and
Markusen  1991).
Transfer of technology is generally characterised as a hierarchical process, where host
countries are passive recipient of technologies  developed in the home country. This assumption,
which is even more stringent  when applied to the North-South  space, is not consistent with some
recent evidence about multinational  activity. First, R&D activity carried out by multinationals  is
often geographically dispersed (Cantwell 1993 and 1994, Kumar 1995). Second, R&D is often
carried out by networks of firms located in different countries, including developing countries
(Contractor  and Lorange, 1988,  Vonortas,  1991,  Pietrobelli,  1996).  Third,  aggregate  evidence  shows
that international  trade generates  R&D spillovers:  the larger  the share of imports  from countries  rich
in R&D capital, the larger the developing  countries'  foreign R&D capital  and the larger their rate of
growth  (Coe, Helpman  and Hoffmaister,  1995).
Thus, international  flows of technology  do not necessarily  imply  unilateral and hierarchical
transfers of knowledge.  Moreover,  the geographical  dispersion  of R&D activities  can take place in a
non-intemalised  way, through co-operative  arm length agreements  between different firms. Some
recent theoretical  contributions  support  this evidence  by showing  that spillovers  may induce R&D
co-operation  between firms, also when endowments  of knowledge  across partners are asymmetric
(d'Aspremont  and Jaquemin  1988,  Bhattacharya,  Glazer  and Sappington,  1990  and 1992,  Aghion and
Tirole, 1994).
This paper develops a  theoretical model which brings together some  of the  central
assumptions  of the literature on R&D cooperation  and of the literature on hierarchical  transfer of
4technology.  It  inquires whether  R&D  cooperation  is an  effective tool  to  intemalise  asymmetric
knowledge  spillovers  in  a  hypothetical  North-South  setting.  The  model  examines  the  R&D
cooperation decision jointly with the choice of the institutional format characterising the transfer of
technology.  The  multinational  can  set  up  a  subsidiary  and  compete  with  a  local  producer.
Alternatively  it can set up an arm length agreement with the local producer. In the first case we have
a duopoly, in the second one a monopoly in the host market. Notice that this simplified setting does
not  reduce  the  generality  of our  results,  that  would  also  hold  in  a  more  general  oligopolistic
framework.
The  theoretical  findings  are  tested  by  using  a  data  bank  containing  632  inter-firm
technological international agreements, where at least one of the partners is located in a developing
countryl.  The empirical results, derived by testing a dichotomous choice model, support the major
theoretical findings: R&D agreements are particularly Likely  to take a non-hierarchical format (each
partner contributes to the R&D effort),  in knowledge intensive industries and  when technological
asymmetries between home and host countries are not excessively large.
This empirical analysis is very innovative compared to other analysis of international R&D.
First, because  it looks at technological agreements between a group of developing countries and a
group of advanced countries, whereas previous works were mostly focused on advanced countries.
(Kumar,  1995 gives a useful survey). Second, because most of the empirical literature has looked at
the R&D activity carried out by subsidiaries, up to now, and not at arm-length agreements (a survey
of the very little existing evidence on technological agreements is provided by  Pietrobelli,  1996).
Third, and consequently, because previous works mainly focused on the determinants of localisation
of R&D, whereas, here, we can also address  institutional features of R&D cooperation at the firm
level.
The next section will list the major assumptions underlying the theoretical model. Section
three will derive the equilibria about R&D cooperation and the institutional format under which such
cooperation takes place. Section four reports the empirical results and section five concludes.
1. These  agreements  are a subset  of the Cati-Merit  data bank. For a description  of the data base, see Duysters  and
Hagedorn, 1993.  For a descriptive  application  to developing  countries  see Freeman  and Hagedom,  1994. Some
of the empirical  results  reported  in  this paper can also  be found  in Barba  Navaretti  and Bigano,  1996
52. The theoretical model
2.1. Background
The common starting  point of the literature  on hierarchical  transfers of technology (see, for
example,  Ethier, 1986, Wright, 1993  Ethier and Markusen, 1991)  is some R&D activity creating a
firm specific  asset, which can be a new product,  a reduction in production  costs or the improvement
of product quality. This new knowledge  is held by the parent company,  who wants to exploit this
asset on a foreign  market.
This literature examines the choice between arm length contracts (e.g. licensing) and
subsidiaries,  by looking  at the trade off between lower establishment  costs and larger spillovers  of
proprietary  knowledge.  Licensing  does not involve  the fixed  cost of setting  up a new productive  unit
in a foreign  country.  However,  it engenders  larger spillovers.  In principle,  one would expect that the
larger potential  spillovers  (as measured  by the share of knowledge  capital on total assets of the firm)
the more likely  the transfer  to be internalised  through  a subsidiary.
Yet, subsidiaries  are not water tight. Spillovers  may still arise because  the employees  of the
subsidiary can quit and  set up an independent firm (Ethier and Markusen, 1991) or because
competitors  in the host market manage to learn the trade after a while (Wang  and Markusen, 1992).
The interesting  result of this literature  is that the larger  the potential  spillovers,  the larger  the amount
of knowledge  the multinational  will transfer  to the subsidiary  in equilibrium.  Intuitively,  in .the  first
case, the multinational  buys in the employees'  loyalty, by granting them a larger share of future
expected  rents; in the second case, it preserves  the competitive  edge of its subsidiary,  by ensuring
that the latter has always a superior  technology  than local competitors.
The lesson we can draw is that knowledge spillovers can be internalised only through
contracts that give the partners a  large enough incentive not to  defect. A  subsidiary, where
employees can quit once the learning process is accomplished,  raises the same problems  than any
arm length agreement. Moreover, spillovers across independent  firms can only be internalised
through knowledge  sharing contracts.
If  knowledge sharing contracts (including asymmetrical ones) are the  only  mean to
internalise knowledge, there may be  circumstances under which the multinational prefers to
6cooperate  in R&D with the local firm.  The model  developed  in this paper  examines  whether  there is
ground for R&D cooperation  under asymmetrical  spillovers  and R&D efficiency.  The model merges
some of the major assumptions  of the literature  on asymmetrical  transfer of knowledge  and on R&D
joint ventures.
2.2. Structure  of the game
We look at the case of a multinational  which carries out some R&D which is only related  to
its activities in the host market. In the host market  there is another  competing  firm, also carrying  out
some R&D. The multinational  can choose  between  setting  up a subsidiary  and competing  against  the
local firm (a duopoly) and establishing an arm-length  agreement with the local firm and share
monopoly  profits. If they form the arm-length  agreement  the two firms can also decide to cooperate
in R&D.  In the duopoly  there is never  cooperation  in R&D.
The  rules  of  the  game  can be  described as  follows. The  interactions between the
multinational  and the developing  country  firm can be characterised  as an infinitely  repeated  game in
which each period is divided  into four stages:
- in the first  stage, the multinational firm decides whether to  share the technology with the
developing country firm or  to  produce directly in the  developing country, by establishing a
subsidiary.  In the first case,  the agreement  is characterised  by a contract  which specifies  the share of
profit which are taken by the multinational  firm.  This share can be viewed  as a licence  for the use of
the technology  or as an equity share in a joint venture.  If the two firms opt for the subsidiary  there
are bilateral knowledge  spillovers  (each firms' R&D creates knowledge  spillovers  towards  the other
firm). These spillovers  are asymmetric.  The developing  country  firm receives  spillovers  larger than
those received  by the multinationals.
- in the second stage, if they have opted for the agreement,  the two firms decide whether or not to
cooperate  on the research and development  of a process innovation  which reduces  the production
costs of the developing  country firm. For simplicity's  sake, we assume that innovation is market-
specific  which implies that the R&D effort carried out by the two firms, either cooperatively  or non
cooperatively,  benefits  the production  process  only of the developing  country  firm (which is the only
producer in the market). The multinational  firm achieves an indirect  benefit from its R&D effort
through its share of profits from the agreement.  Notice that R&D cooperation  can occur only if the
7two firms opt for the agreement.  If they do not, or if one of the two defects,  then market competition
takes  the form of a non-cooperative  duopoly  where non-cooperation  concerns  both output and R&D.
- in the third stage, production  takes place. As previously  stated, the developing  country  market is a
monopoly. This market remains a monopoly if the multinational  firm chooses the agreement; it
becomes  a duopoly if the multinational  firm decides to produce  directly in the developing  country.
Therefore, the multinational  firm has an incentive  to share the technology rather than to produce
directly because the first option provides larger profits in the output market (the sum of duopoly
profits  is  lower than  the  monopoly profit). 2 However, when choosing the  agreement the
multinational provides larger spillovers  to  the developing country firm, and also run a  risk of
defection  from the agreement  (this risk obviously  does not exist in the duopoly  case).
- in thefourth and final stage,  the developing  country  firm decides  whether  or not to comply  with the
agreement.  In the latter case, it does not transfer  to the multinational  firm the agreed  share of profits
(e.g. it does not pay the licence or it transfers all profits and the technology  to a new legal entity).
When the developing country firm chooses to defect, the multinational  firm reacts by producing
directly  in the developing  country  in the following  period.
The game tree is described  in Figure 1, where the payoffs  are as follows. Let m denote the
Multinational  firm and s the developing country (Southern) firm, whereas c denotes the payoffs
when the two firm Cooperate  on the development  of a process innovation  and n the payoffs when
they carry out their own R&D  Non cooperatively.
Then:
- nj  i, j=m,s and i=c,n are the duopoly  Nash-Cournot  payoffs  that the two firms achieve when the
multinational  firm decides  to produce  directly  in the developing  country.
2 Again,  we re-call  that the analysis  is confined  to the two firm  case  for simplicity's  sake. A more  general
oligopoly  setting  would  provide  qualitatively  similar  results.
8Figure  1: The Game Tree
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Compliance  m,n  ,  s,n- 7tdii, j=m,s and i =c,n are the firms' profits when the developing  country firm  defects in the last
stage  of a given period  of the game;
- *rjji,  j=m,s and i=c,n are the firms' profits when the multinational  chooses  the agreement  and the
developing  country  firm complies  with it.
Moreover,  let us use the following  definitions:
- £  is the share of profits of the developing  country firm which are paid back to the multinational
when there is no defection  (O  <F  <  1);
- a < 1, is the discount factor of the developing  country firm. A large value of a  implies that the
southern  firm has a low discount  rate;
- xij >  O, i=c,n and j=m,s is the amount  of R&D  carried out by the finns; xi, i=c,n denotes  the vector
i  -
(X'm,x's);
- 's  > fm,  where kj, j=m,s is the parameter  which defines the level of the R&D marginal cost.
Therefore,  we assume  that R&D  efficiency  is generally  lower in the developing  country.
- 7t#s(xi) > 0, i=c,n is the monopoly  profit  obtained  by the southern  firm, gross of R&D costs and the
agreement  fee.
Particular  attention  must be given  to our assumptions  on R&D  spillovers.  If the multinational
opts for the subsidiary  and the market is a duopoly,  there are technological  spillovers  defined by the
parameters  P3s  and Pm, where P3i,  i=s,m  measures  the reduction  of firm i's production  costs induced
by a marginal  change of R&D expenditure  in country  j, ij=m,s and i#j. Moreover,  Ps 2 Pm' i.e. the
multinational,  being  technologically  more advanced,  transfers more  knowledge  than what it receives.
If instead  the multinational  opts for the agreement,  there is one producer  only in the market, which
receives a spillover equal to D 2 Ps 2 ,m  from the multinational's  R&D activity.  This is so, because
the R&D carried out within this particular  agreement  does not concem the multinational's  activities
elsewhere.  Moreover, it is quite reasonable  to assume that the Southem firm learns more from its
counterpart under an arm-length agreement than through external interaction in a  competitive
market, even if R&D is not carried out cooperatively.  If this activity is carried out cooperatively,
9there is full knowledge sharing and the uni-directional  spillover is equal to  1. In words, in the
cooperative  case, both the multinational's  R&D and the one carried out by the developing country
firm  have the same impact  on the latter  production  costs.
The decision  variables  are as follows:  the multinational  decides  how to sell in the developing
country  market (technology  sharing  or direct production),  the amount  of R&D, and the profit share s.
The developing  country  firm sets the amount of R&D and the production  level, and decides  whether
or not to comply  with the agreement.
Given the above  definitions,  we have:
(Ia)  Xm,i  = E[#s(xi)  - (1/2)5 s(xis)2]  - (1/2)m(x1n) 2 i-c,n
(Ib)  7E*s,i  = (1-s)[7S 1 #(xi)  - (1/2)4s(xis)2]  i=cn
where we assume decreasing  returns to scale  in R&D.  Moreover:
(2a)  7cdmi  = -(1/2)+m(xim) 2 i=c,n
(2b)  7jdSi  =  7#s(xi)  - (l/2)Os(xis)2  i=c,n
In order to solve the game backward,  let us now consider  the last stage of each period  of the
game.
2.3. A long term agreement
The developing  country  firm does not defect in the last stage  of a given period  of the game if
its discounted  payoff when it complies  with the agreement  is larger than its discounted  payoff when
it defects at period t and then is "punished"  by the multinational's  decision  to produce  directly  in the
developing  country.  If defection  does not take place in the first period,  then it will not take place in
any other period.  Therefore,  the no defection  condition  is:
7* si/(l-c) 2 7tds 5 + a7°s/(l  a)
which implies
10(3a)  a  2  (lid  Si - ss,i)/(ndsi  - 'Cos)  =
= 4[R#S(xi)-(  l/2)os(xis)2 ]l/[(s(xi>{l/2)s(xis)2-  os]
or
(3b)  a 2 e/[l - ros/(lS#s(xi)  - (1/2)4s(xis)2)]
Notice that this  condition is more easily satisfied when the developing country firm's
discount rate is low, when the profit share which goes to the multinational  is low and when the
duopoly payoff  for the developing  firn is also low.
Recall that e is a decision  variable  of the multinational.  Therefore,  this firm will choose the
largest  £ such that the developing  country  firm  complies  with the agreement,  i.e.:
(4)  E = a[l  - n°s/(R#s(xi) - (1/2)s(xis)2)] = a[(Rdsij-7os)/7[dsi]<  I
The equilibrium  value of s does not allow m to extract  the whole rent from the southern  firm.
The condition  for the developing  country  firm  to agree  on technology  sharing is:
(5)  R*  si 2 'X's  i--n,c
i.e. the profit for this firm  when it agrees  on technology  sharing  must be larger than its profit  when it
refuses, that is when the outcome is the duopoly in which both firms produce in the developing
country.  Therefore,  it could be argued  that the multinational  firm could  choose  E in order to meet the
participation  constraint  (5), i.e. e such  that
7tS,i  - 7t1S =  °-
We can show that this is not true and that, in order to prevent the southern firm from
defecting,  the multinational  must leave some of the rent  to the developing  country  firm, i.e. ts,i  > n
11Condition  (3a) can indeed  be written as:
(6)  a 2 (7,ds,i - X*s,iy[((tds,i - *s,i) + (,x*s,i - gos)]
where we have added  ad subtracted ,*,,i. Notice  that if7x*s;  =  -'s  we would have  a 2 1, which can
be satisfied  only for a =  1, i.e. when the discount  rate is equal  to zero. This implies that defection  in
the last stage would  be very likely  and that the equilibrium  choice for the multinational  would be the
establishment of a  subsidiary in the developing country. Therefore, in order to  implement an
agreement,  the multinational  must accept  it*s,j>  "°s
Let n*s i - °s  = Os,i be the part of total profits [t#5(XI)  - (l/2)0s(xis) 2 - (7di  -
which goes to the developing  country firm. The part which goes to the multinational  is Om,i = S[i
#S(xi) - (1/2)4s(xis)2] =  rds 5 i - 7s*i;  which implies 7td5 i  = Esji + Omj- Using these definitions,
the following  proposition  can be proved:
Proposition 1: The share of total  profits in the developing  country which  goes to the Southern  firm
does not depend on the  firms' choice about R&D cooperation,  unless the choice of cooperating in
R&D affects the discountfactor a. Hence,  R&D cooperation  cannot  be used as a stabilisingfactor  of
the arm length agreement,  unless it affects the inter temporal  preferences  of the Southern  firm.
Proof. Let us first proof that the stability  of the arm-length  agreement  depends  on the share
of profits  which goes  to the southern  firm. From  (6) we can write:
(7)  a  2 l/[l + (r*s,i  - gos)/(Xds,i  - 1*s,i)]  = 1/1(  + es,i/em,i]  m  1/(l+ai)
where ai = Os,i/ 0 m,i; Moreover,  the share of profits which goes to the developing  country firm is B
s,i/( 0m,i+0s,i) = ai/(l+ar). Using  the above  definitions  and the optimal  choice  of E defined  by (4):
(8)  Os,i/( 0m,i+Os,i)  = (-a)
Therefore, given a,  the share does not depend on whether or not firms cooperate in R&D. This
implies that ai  is also independent  on the firms' choice about R&D cooperation and so is the
condition  which guarantees  the stability  of the agreement.
12This first result implies that R&D cooperation does not help in stabilising the overall
agreement,  if the only impact  of cooperation  is to increase  overall monopoly  profits. Indeed, even if
overall  profits increase,  equilibrium  6 will also increase;  i.e. m will adjust  a so that s keep  receiving  a
constant  share of profits net of s' reserve  duopoly  profits 7Ps  (ai). In contrast,  if R&D cooperation  is
expected  to generate  also other future  benefits, in the form of spillovers  and long-term  transmission
of tacit knowledge,  s' inter  temporal  preferences  will change,  and a will incrase. In this case, ai will
also increase. We have therefore shown that R&D agreements  can stabilise agreements aimed at
internalising  knowledge  spillovers  only when they generate  intangible  benefits  deriving  from a long
term relationship  of trust. 3
Given that the optimal  choice of E lead both firms to comply with the agreement  in the last
stage of each period of the game, let us move to stage  three and two, when the production  and R&D
investment  decisions  are taken.
2.4. Optimal production and investment In R&D
Using  the optimal  value  of E (from la and lb), profits  become:
(9a)  7[*m,i  = os,(xi)  -(1/2)4(xis)2 - x°s] -(l/2)4,(xim) 2
(9b)  7J*si  = It"  + (l-a)[7# 5(xi) - (1/2) 5(xi52 - °sI
Notice that 7°s  is the profit that the southem firm guarantees  itself anyway. Therefore, its
total profit must be equal to 7irs  plus the share of additional  profits that the multinational  leaves to
the southern  firm in order to stabilise  the agreement.
At this stage of the game, only s takes a decision,  i.e. it sets the optimal  production  level by
maximising  7#s(xi) (the only element of the profit function  which depends on output). The usual
3 This  conclusion  should  not  be surprising,  given  the  results  obtained  in  the industrial  organisation  literature  on
the  profitability  and  stability  of cartels  and  /or R&D  coalitions  (Cf.  Donsimoni  et al.,  1986;  Motta,  1993).  When
there  are  two  firms  only,  the  stability  of an agreement  in a repeated  relationship  crucially  depends  on  the firms'
discount  rate.  The  higher  the discount  rate,  the  easier  for the agreement  to be stable  even  in the presence  of
small  gains.  The  problem  in our case  is that R&D  cooperation  increases  both  relative  gains  and incentives  to
defect,  leaving  the  ratio  unchanged.  Therefore,  only  an increase  of the  discount  rate  can  increase  the  stability  of
the  agreement  between  the  two  firns. The  link  between  profitability  and stability  is also  discussed  in Carraro-
Siniscalco  (1996).
13optimality condition (marginal revenue equal marginal cost) determines the optimal monopoly
output  (Y* s). For simplicity,  let us use the symbol O#s(xi)  to denote  also the level of profits obtained
in the developing  country  when  the production  level is optimally  chosen.
In order to derive the optimal  R&D efforts carried out by the two firms, let us formalise  our
assumptions  on R&D  spillovers.  In the cooperative  case:
&cs(y*s)/oxs  = -I  and
aSc(y*S)/Ixm  =4-D>  -I
whereas:
'CS(Y*S)/'Xi  = -1,  i=s,m,
in the cooperative  case.  In words,  this implies  that:
- R&D  concerns  process  innovation,  i.e. a higher  R&D level reduces  the firms' production  costs.
- the spillover  on southern firm's  costs of the multinational's  R&D is equal to ,3  when the two firms
do not cooperate  in R&D  and t is equal  to -I when  R&D is carried  out cooperatively.
If the multinational  decides to produce directly in the developing country, Nash-Cournot
payoffs  depend  on bilateral spillovers,  i.e. lt0m = lc0 m(pm,ps)  and ns = ns(i3,3s),  where Ps > Pm,
and where f 3m < P3,  N°i/t8f3  >0, 8°i8apj <0, i=m,s  and i￿j.  Notice  again that spillovers  in the case of
agreement  are larger  than in the case of subsidiary.
We have assumed  that spillovers  increase  when there is cooperation.  The literature stresses
that much of technological  knowledge  is not codified,  but, rather, it is held in a tacit form. Hence, it
can only be transmitted  on the job, and when there is a strict interaction  between  the parties (David,
1993).  This assumption  differs from the one normally  made by the literature  on R&D cooperation
(Cf. D'Aspremont  Jacquemin, 1988),  where spillovers  do not change if there is cooperation.  This is
important  because  the change  of spillovers  from non cooperation  to cooperation  is a crucial effect to
understand  the results on the profitability  of R&D  cooperation.
14Furthermore,  spillovers without  cooperation  (the parameter  3)  are  likely to  be  larger  the
larger and the more efficient the learning effort of the Southern firm (which is also partially captured
by the coefficient  of R&D investments 4s). Spillovers will also  be affected (ambiguously)  by the
degree of knowledge intensity (relative to other tangible and intangible assets) of the firm  and the
industry concerned by the agreement. On the one hand, the larger the knowledge intensity, the larger
the  amount  of  knowledge  to  spread  around.  On  the  other  hand,  learning  is  more  difficult  in
knowledge intensive industries.4
Using these assumptions, the first order conditions for the optimal choice of R&D are:
No R&D cooperation.
(1Oa)  ait*m/axm  = aR-N#5 /ac 5) - 4mXm  = 0
(1Ob)  *s/xs  = (l-a)[(-an#s/acs) - 4Sxs]  = 0
where we used on#4slxi = (a#s/acs)(8cs/oxi),  i=m,s, and where o-t# 5/ac5 < 0.
R&D cooperation
When the two firms cooperate, they maximise the sum of their profits, i.e. n*c =7#S(xi)  -
(1/2)(x)  2)m(xm) 2. This yields:
(I la)  0z *c/1xm  = (-ait#s/acs)  - 4mxm  = 0
(I lb)  a7t*c/aXs  = (-aOr#sIacs)  - +Sxs  = 0
Therefore, using (10a,b), the non-cooperative R&D levels are implicitly defined by:
(12a)  xnm = acK-N#slacs)/4m  > 0
4 The assumption  that spillovers  are larger the more knowledge  intensive is the industry is standard in the
literature  on asymmetric  transfer  of knowledge  (see Markusen,  1995  for a survey).  The assumption  that they are
larger the more intense the learning effort of the southern firm can be found, for example, in Wang and
Blomstrom,  1992.
15(12b)  xns = (-f#s/0cs)/0s  > 0
where  xnm > xns iff I > aj  > Om/Os,  i.e. when  Os is sufficiently  larger  than Om.
If the two firms cooperate  in R&D,  their R&D efforts are implicitly  defined  by:
(13a)  xCm = (-N#s/acs)/m  >  0
(13b)  xcs = (-#s/ 8 cs)/Os > 0
Notice that xcm > xcs because $m < Os. Moreover:
(I 4a)  xcm > xnm
because ap  <  1. The increased R&D effort of the multinational reduces costs and  increases
production  (ays/acs < 0). This implies  that (-87r#s/&s)  under cooperation  is larger than (-N#,/Ocs)
when the two firms do not cooperate  in R&D. Indeed,  the impact  of a change of production  costs on
monopoly  profits can be written as:
-N#S/acS = (8X#s/@Ys)(-(ys/&s)
where ys is the equilibrium  production.  Notice  that 8iOs/8ys  Ys  > 0. As a consequence,  both N,sia
ys and -oys/acs are larger under cooperation.  Hence, -Ngs/8cs is also larger when the two firms
cooperate  in R&D,  which implies:
(14b)  xcs > xns
The  same conclusion can  be  achieved by  noticing that  R&D  efforts  are  strategic
complements.  Therefore,  equilibrium  investments  in R&D are larger under cooperation  for both the
multinational  and the southern  firm.
2.5 Cooperating in R&D
16Is  the choice to cooperate  in R&D profitable? To answer this  question we must compare
benefits and costs of R&D cooperation. For the multinational, this yields:
(15a)  7tcm,c- 7 tm,n =
=  OL[7C#s(xc)  -_#S(xn)]  -(1/20m)[H2c(l -a2 P2)+(H2c-H2n)(0m/4s+aI32)]
where Hc is the value of -8#S/O^cs  under cooperation, whereas Hn is the value of -N#S/8cs  when the
two firms do not cooperate in R&D. From the previous discussion Hc-Hn 2 0. The first term of the
right-hand side represents the increased monopoly profit obtained by the multinational when the two
firms cooperate  and  increase their  R&D  efforts, thus reducing  costs  and  increasing  profits.  The
second term represents the cost increase induced by higher R&D spending under cooperation.
For the developing country firm, the comparison yields:
(15b)  71*s,c l *s,n =
=  (I  -Ca)[7t#S(Xc)  - 7C#S(xn)]  - [(1  -Cx)/2+s)](H2 c-H2 n)
Again, the first term of the right-hand side represents the increased profit that the southern
firm  obtains  when  it cooperates  (which is  lower the  higher a),  whereas  the  second term  is the
increased R&D cost.
Let  us  assume  that  firms do  not  defect  from a  potential  decision  to  cooperate  in  R&D
(because  defection  only takes  place at the  last stage and concerns the whole agreement  of which
R&D cooperation is one possible feature). Moreover, let us assume that:
- the effects of R&D cooperation on -o#s/ocs  are small with respect to those on the level of profits
and R&D costs;
- the effects on profits of a change of R&D efforts are larger than those on total R&D costs. 5
Then, we have:
5 This  is the case for linear  demand  and  cost functions.  See d'Aspremont-Jacquemin  (1988).
17Proposition 2: The multinational is more likely to choose to cooperate in R&D with the developing
country firm  whenever the latter discount rate is low (a is large), the marginal cost of R&D is low (4
m is small), and the spillover  ,B  is low. R&D cooperation is profitable  when the right-hand side  of
(15a) is non-negative, i.e. for  Om < O  *m, where  )*m  is implicitly defined by O  *m = H2c[l+a(1-a)  3
2]12[ax[IS(xc)  - 7r# 5(xn)] -(H2c-H2nJ/2O)J.  Similarly, the southern firm  chooses not to cooperate if
the right-hand side of (lSb)  is non-negative, i.e. Os < O  *s where 4  *s is implicitly defined by O*s =
(H 2 &H2n/2[ 7r#S(Xc)  - s  (xn)]
Proof.  From  the  differentiation  of eq.  (15a) with  respect to  a,  Om and  D  and using  the  above
assumptions.
The  intuition  behind  the  first  result  is easy.  An  increase  of  a  increases  E  because  the
Southern firm  is less keen to defect. This gives the multinational the possibility to obtain a  larger
share of profits in the developing country market. Since R&D cooperation increases these profits, a
larger a increases the return of R&D cooperation for the multinational firm. At the same time,  an
increase of a reduces the difference between  "*s  ,c - 7*s  n' thus reducing the incentive to cooperate
in R&D for the developing country firm. This second effect is dominated by the first one.
The second result can be explained as follows. When Om is small, the amount  of R&D is
larger  both in the  cooperative  and  in the  non-cooperative case.  However, the  increase  of  R&D,
induced by the  spillover change in the cooperative case, becomes larger, thus  reducing costs  and
increasing profits. In other words, if Om is small, R&D becomes less costly and it is therefore more
convenient to  carry it out cooperatively, when knowledge is fully  shared between the two  firms.
Notice that R&D cooperation  is profitable  only if Om  < O*m  and Os < O*s,  where O*m  and O*, are
defined above. This result implies that it is not convenient to cooperate in R&D if one of the partners
is particularly inefficient in carrying out its R&D.
A change of 13  has  several effects. First, a lower ,B  increases the difference between R&D
costs with and without cooperation. At the same time, though, when D decreases, the impact of R&D
cooperation on production costs becomes larger, because D is less close to 1, the level of spillovers in
the cooperative case. This  increases the difference 7l#s(xc) - 7c#s(xn) 6. The net change in benefits
6  Notice that when Ps increases,  the southern  firm's duopoly profit increases.  This reduces  the threat to the
southern  firm which  has a larger  incentive  to defect from  the technology  sharing  agreement.  Therefore  E must be
lowered (see eq. (4)). However,  this does not reduce the incentive  to cooperate  because  the same effect occurs
18with cooperation  is positive for 4s  5 ¢*s because we assumed that the effects on profits are larger
than  the  effects  on  R&D  costs.  Notice  that  with  respect  to  the  standard  literature  on  R&D
cooperation  (d'Aspremont-Jacquemin,  1988;  Suzumura,  1992)  our  result  states  that  R&D
cooperation  is more  likely when D  is low rather than high. This can be explained by the fact that
spillovers are usually assumed to be the same in the cooperative and non-cooperative case, whereas
in  our  framework,  when  firms cooperate,  there  is full transfer  of  knowledge and  the  spillover
becomes equal to one. The consequent reduction of costs is the dominant effect which explains why
the lower the spillover without cooperation, the more profitable is R&D cooperation.
A  further  remark  is important.  In order to  assess the factors  which  explain the  available
empirical  evidence on  the emergence of cooperative  R&D between multinational  and developing
country firms, it is not sufficient to understand when the multinational finds it profitable to cooperate
on R&D once it chooses the agreement. It is also important to understand this latter choice, because
in the model no R&D cooperation takes place if the two firms decide to compete in the developing
country  market.  It  is indeed possible that  some of the  factors which  increase the  multinational's
incentive to cooperate (the difference 7t*m  c - lt*m,n) reduce its incentive to choose the agreement.
Let us therefore move to the first stage of the game.
2.6. Subsidiaries versus arm-length agreements
The multinational chooses to implement an agreement with the developing country firm iff:
(16)  *mi  '  7E 0m( 1 m,Ps)  i=c,n
Under what conditions is this inequality more likely to be satisfied? Is it when the two firms
cooperate in R&D? First, let us analyse which factors affect the difference 7c*m,c  - 71 0m(pm,I 3s). Let
us write the profit when the multinational opts for the agreement as a function of P. Then, in the non-
cooperative case:
(17a)  t*m,n(O)  - 7om(m' 13s)=
both in the cooperative  and non cooperative  case. By  contrast,  this effect  may reduce  the incentive  to implement
the technology  sharing  agreement  (see below).
19= a[71#s(xn())  - (1/2)4s(xns(3))2 - tos(pm,ps)] - (l/2)+m(xnm(P))2  - 7tom(3m,ps)
= aM(xn(13))  - (IQa)Tom(13m,4s) - (aHn(13)2/2)[(Qs + acmp1)+s*m]
where  M(xi),  i=c,n, is the  monopoly  surplus,  i.e. the  difference  between  monopoly  profits  and
duopoly profits in the developing country market: M(xi) = X#S(xi)  - [Trm(Ims)  + [°s(Pm'Ps)]
Notice that:
- aM(xi(p)),  i=c,n, is the share of the monopoly surplus which goes to the multinational. It increases
with P;
- (I -cC)n&m(fm,Ps)  is the share of the multinational's duopoly profit (the profit that the multinational
can guarantee itself by producing in the developing country) which goes to the southern firm;
- (aHn( 3)2/2)[(+s  +  acm[32)/Osom] are  the  multinational's  R&D  costs  plus  the  share  of  the
developing country firm's R&D costs  implicitly covered by the multinational through the share l-s
of profits which are left to the southern firm.
Symmetrically, in the case in which firms cooperate in R&D:
(17b)  7[*m,c(l)  - ntm(n,1s)=
= Cl#s(xc(l))  - (1/2)Os(xcs(l))2 - 0s(pm,'ps)] - (1/2)+m(xcm(1))2 - 7tom(pm,ds)
= aM(xc(l))  - (l-a)7rom(p3m,13s) - (Hc(l) 2/2)[(Os + acm)/Osom]
From these equalities we can conclude that:
Proposition  3:  The  arm-length  agreement  is  the  multinational's  optimal  strategy  when  the
developing country firm's  discount rate is low (a is high), when its duopoly profit is low (3m is low,
Ps  is large), and when the monopoly surplus is large (P is large in the non-cooperative case).
Proof: When a  is large the share of the monopoly surplus which goes to the multinational
increases,  whereas  the  share  of m's  duopoly  profit which  implicitly  goes to  the  southern  firm
20decreases. At the same time, the R&D cost increases because the amount of R&D increases with a
and because the share of costs paid by the multinational increases. However, this is a second order
effect, dominated by the two previous ones.  When O 3m is low and Ps is large, m' duopoly profits are
low (N°i/api  >0,  N°i/a13j < 0, ij=m,s,  i￿j),  thus reducing the loss (l-a)it 0m(Pm,13s). Finally, when
M(xi),  i=c,n,  increases, both 7t*m,c(l) - 70m(pm,ps) and lt*m,n(O) - ir 0m(pm,ps) increase. This
latter difference increases with 13  because 7c*m  n(P) is an increasing function of ,B.
A potential problem with proposition 3 is that P  and P.s  are likely to be positively correlated.
Thus, an increase in P  increases the monopoly profit, but the contemporary increase in P3s  will raise
the  Southern firm's duopoly profits. In turn, an increase  in 7t's(pm,s)  reduces  E,  i.e. the share of
monopoly profits to the multinational. Therefore, even if the net effect of increasing spillovers is to
make the agreement relatively more profitable, there is a trade off, unless the correlation between ,B
and Ps is sufficiently low.
The choice of cooperating in R&D breaks this correlation, as 13  is always  I In other words,
for any  level of spillovers, cooperation maximises the diffusion of knowledge and, thus, monopoly
profits. This leads us to the final issue to be analysed. Is the profitability of the arm length agreement
with respect to the subsidiary consistent with cooperation in R&D? When the multinational opts for
the agreement, does it also choose to cooperate in R&D? The answer is provided by the following
proposition:
Proposition  4: Whenever R&D cooperation is profitable,  it is also profitable  to opt for  an  arm
length  agreement  rather  than for  the  subsidiary.  This  always  holds  if the  asymmetry  in R&D
efficiency is large.
Proof. The difference between Tc*m,c(l)  - n0m(Pm,ps) and Rt*m  n(O) - 7t 0m(m, 13s) is positive iff:
c[M(xc(l))  - M(xn(p))]  - [Hc(1) 2(4s  + axm)  - aHn(p) 2 (os + axm132)]/2fsfm > 0
whereas R&D cooperation is profitable for the multinational iff:
x[M(xc(I)) - M(xn(p))] - [H2c(I-a 2 p3 2)+(H2c-H2n)(+m/0s+a3 2)]/20m > 0
The second inequality implies the first one if:
214m/'4s < a( I - 2)/(l -a2Ip2)
i.e. if the R&D efficiency of the multinational is sufficiently larger than the one of the developing
country firm. Note  that this  is a sufficient and  not a  necessary condition. The implication is that
R&D agreement will emerge also if the asymmetry in R&D efficiency between the two partners is
large. Also recall that R&D cooperation does not affect the share with which the monopoly surplus is
divided between the two firms (Proposition I  ).
Therefore, from Proposition 4, the profitability of R&D cooperation  implies the profitability
of the arm-length agreement with respect to the subsidiary, which  implies that the multinational  is
likely to opt for the agreement whenever  R&D cooperation  is profitable. Note, however,  that the
opposite statement  is not true: as discussed in Proposition 3, there may  be values of 4 and  ,B  for
wvhich  R&D cooperation is less profitable than a non cooperative arm length agreement.
2.6. Main intuitions and results of relevance for the empirical analysis
The major intuitions from the theoretical model can be summarised into the following points,
some of which provide hypothesis to be tested in the empirical analysis below.
First, spillovers are costly for the R&D intensive multinational. Indeed, if the multinational
produces directly  in the developing country its duopoly profits will be lower; if it implements an
agreement with a local firm, its share of the monopoly profits will also be lower. However, the net
effect of increaslng spillovers is to raise the relative profitability of the agreement, with respect to
the subsidiary (Proposition 3).
Second, an arm length agreement  is a mean to internalise knowledge spillovers. Under the
agreement, the multinational will touch a share of monopoly profits. If there is no R&D cooperation,
monopoly profits will be larger, the larger the spillovers. In this framework, R&D cooperation is not
a tool to  internalise spillovers: the agreement per se is the 'internalising device'. R&D cooperation,
though, increases overall monopoly profits, as it transform the spillover into deliberate (and larger)
transfer  of  knowledge  from  the  multinational  to  the  Southern  firm.  Therefore,  it  makes  the
multinational more likely to choose the arm length agreement than the subsidiary (Proposition 3).
22Does it also stabilise the agreement  ? i.e. does it make the Southern  firm less likely to defect at the
end of the first period?. This is not the case, unless R&D cooperation  generates long term synergies
between the partners and changes the inter-temporal  preferences  of the Southern  firm (Proposition
1).  -3
Third, inter-temporal  preferences  of the Southern firm, the efficiency in R&D of the two
firms, and the extent of spillovers,  all affect the choice of cooperating  in R&D. Cooperation  is more
likely if the Southern  firm cares much about the future benefits  of the agreement  (because it will be
less likely to defect), if the multinational's  R&D efficiency is high (because the increased R&D
effort is cost efficient), if the Southern firm's R&D efficiency is not exceedingly low (otherwise
there is free riding on the multinational's  R&D effort) and if spillovers  are relatively  small (because
if spillovers  are large, there is a large transfer of knowledge  even without  cooperation  and the net
benefits of cooperation  are small) (Proposition  2). The last result underlines  the ambiguous  role of
spillovers.  On the one hand they must be large  enough  to make  the arm-length  agreement  the optimal
choice (from Proposition 3). On the other hand, the  larger they are, the smaller the relative
profitability  of R&D cooperation  (Proposition  2).
Fourth, whenever  R&D cooperation  is profitable,  the multinational  opts for the arm-length
agreement (Proposition 4). In  contrast, the reverse statement is not  necessarily true, i.e. the
profitability  of the agreement  does not imply the profitability  of R&D cooperation  (otherwise arm
length  agreements  without  R&D cooperation  would not exist).  Proposition  4 always holds when the
multinational's  R&D efficiency is large relatively  to the Southern  firm. This is the standard  case in
the North-South context. Therefore, R&D cooperation in arm length agreements is an optimal
outcome,  also when there is asymmetry  in R&D efficiency  between  the partners.  Yet, we know from
the previous point, that inefficiencies  must not be too large: if the Southern firm has exceedingly
small skill endowments  and, consequently,  exceedingly  high R&D costs, cooperation  is no longer
feasible  (Proposition  2).
Fifth, asymmetries  are consistent with R&D agreements,  because we assume unilateral
spillovers  (from North to South) within  the agreement.  In fact, most of the burden of the additional
R&D investment  under cooperation  is on the shoulders  of the multinational.  Furthermore,  duopoly
profits of the  Southern firm (its  future profits under defection) are lower and,  in turn,  the
multinational's  share of monopoly  profits is larger. This result would no longer hold if we were to
assume bilateral spillovers, when the R&D activity carried out within the agreement affects the
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~~~~~_____  rf  1  12  _________  21  ____  17  40  632multinational's overall profits elsewhere. This case is not studied in this paper, but we would expect
that R&D cooperation is more likely to arise if asymmetries are small.
3. The empirical  analysis
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of arm-length agreements and joint ventures of
both R&D and non R&D types. R&D agreements are always of a cooperative nature. The sample
includes 632 agreements in 29 developing countries established before 1989. A detailed description
of the data base can be found in the appendix.
Table I shows the distribution of the observations according to the type of agreement. Each
type of agreement has special characteristics, which may affect the incentive structure. At this level
of analysis it is possible to group them according to three major criteria. The first  one is whether
agreements  imply  R&D  activities,  or  whether  they  don't.  The second  criteria  is  whether  the
relationship  between the  partners  is hierarchical,  i.e. whether  it is possible  to clearly  identify  a
customer  and  a  supplier. The third  criteria  is whether  the  agreement  is  characterised  by  equity
sharing. In this group we have joint ventures and minority holdings.
We are able to test under which conditions firms that form an arm-length agreement also
decide to cooperate in R&D. Unfortunately the data base does not allow us to test also the decision
of  establishing  a  subsidiary  vs.  an  arm-length  agreement,  as  it  does  not  include  subsidiaries.
Consequently, we can only assess some of the results and some of the key assumptions of our theory.
Table 1 lists the assumptions and results of the theory tested in the empirical analysis.
Table 2 Assumptions and results of the theory tested in the empirical model
Assumptions
Both partners contribute to the R&D effort
Equity type sharing rule
R&D to reduce production costs, not to improve product quality
Results
R&D efforts not excessively asymmetric
Technological asymmetries between firms small
North-South spillovers low
24We use a  dichotomous choice model, in that the dependent variable-takes value  I  if
agreement  i is of the R&D  type and 0 otherwise  (R&D).  We will use the  probit technique  to test the
probability  that the dependent variable is explained  by the independent  ones. The model can be
spelled  out as follows:
P(R&Di=l)=  oa  +  iXi + vinYin + YijZij  +ei  (18)
where a is the constant,  Xi is a vector  of characteristics  of the agreement  i, Yin is a vector of
characteristics  of the industry  n where the product  to which agreement  i refers are classified,  Zij is a
vector of characteristics of country j  where agreement i  is located and Ei  is the error tern.
Unfortunately,  the data base does not provide  information  on firm characteristics.
Table 3 lists all the variables used in the probit. The first group of variables represent
characteristics  of the agreement,  (Xi) and in particular  whether  the relationship  between  the partners
is hierarchical  (HIERARCH)  and whether  the agreement  is equity or non equity (EQUITY).  In our
theoretical model we have assumed that both partners contribute  to R&D (it is not a hierarchical
relationship) and we have shown that R&D cooperation is more likely if contributions are not
excessively  asymmetric.  We therefore  expect R&D cooperation  to emerge when the agreement can
be classified as non hierarchical.  Equity defines a sharing rule and it is likely to be chosen when
contracts are very complex and contingencies  difficult to foresee.  Uncertainty  is typical of a long
term R&D relationship.  Yet, the theoretical  model defines a sharing rule that fits well with both
equity and non equity  types of contracts.  Thus it does  not rule out any option.
Then, we test whether R&D is more likely to be related to vertical rather than horizontal
investments.  We assume that investments  are horizontal if the agreement  concerns the production
and the development  of products  for the final market and vertical if it concerns  the development  of a
factor of production or a  production process (HOVER). Again, this variable tests one of  the
hypothesis  of our model,  that R&D is carried out to reduce production  costs and not to develop  new
products.
Industry specific variables (Yin) measure R&D intensity in the industry. R&D intensive
industries  are assumed  to be knowledge  intensive.  The impact  of knowledge  intensity  on spillovers  is
25Table  3
Vaiables used In the Probit Ansllsys
VNAh  IeSowce  Dea*bbon
R&D IDependent Variable)  Binary  variable  that assumes  value 1 if the agreement  is almed at R&D activitles, and 0 otherwise
Al  Charachtsdgdes  of the agrtment  (Xll
Binary variable  that assumes  value 1 If the  contractual  relationship  among the partners In  the agreement Is one
hierarch  CATI  of equal footing  , and 0 if there is an unilateral transfer of inputs
equitV  CATI  Binary variable  that assumes  value 1 if the firms Involved In the agreement  join in a equity Institution  joint
equitV___________ CATI______________ venture, research corporation, cross and minority holding) and 0 otherwise
Binary variable  that assumes  value 1 if  the agreement  Is aimed at developing  products for the final market and 0
hover  otherwise
Binary variable  that assumes  value 1 If the agreement  Is set forth by at least two firms based In the same region
reglo  CATI  of the world , and  0 otherwise
Subject Environment. Discrete variable  that assumes  value 1 If the  agreement  relates to one product or one subenv  CATI  piece  of technology, 2 if it relates to a few,  3 if it relates to a  very broad range of products or technologies
Opcon  Merit  Operational  Contest. Discrete  variable  that assumes  value 1 if the operational  contest of  the agreement  Is
national, 2 if it relates to a few states, 3 to a continent, 4 If it Is  worfdwide
B) Firms  Dynamics (VIkl
moreagre  CATI  Blnary variable  that assumes  value 1 if at least one of the firms involved In the agreement  is engaged  In other
agreements, and 0 otherwise
mormore  CATI  Binary variable  that assumes  value 1 if  the same firms involved  in the agreement  are engaged in more than one
agreement, and 0 otherwise
Cl  Charachtsristics of the Industry (Yln)
pavitt  CATI  Pavitt's index of industry  s technological charachteriatics: 1 = traditional; 2 =specialised  supplier; 3 = scale
pavitt  CATI  intensive; 4  = science intensive
r  dint  JOCSE  Index of R&D intensity in the sector
D) Characteristics of the country (ZIjI
D  7)  Technological  capabiiities  of rhe  country
gdpop  Bero-Lee  Real  GDP per capita 11985  international prices), 1985
setech  United Nations  Number  of scientist,  engineers and  technicians  involved in R&D activities on total population, 1985
redgdp  United Nations  Total expenses  in R&D  on GDP
patent  United Nations  Patent applications on total population 1988-1990
indes  United Nations  Industrial designs applications on total population 1988-1990
trade  United Nations  Trade marks applications  on total population 1988-1990
manu  World Bank  Share  of Manufacturing on GDP, 1985
high  Barro-Lee  Total gross enrollment ratio for higher education.  1  985
persec  Percentage  of sectors with agreements  involving R&D activities on the number  of sectors in which agreements
take place in the country
wages  I LO.  Wages in Manufacturing per hour, US dollars, 1985ambiguous.  On the one hand a larger share of the firm's intangible assets have ill defined property
rights and is easily dispersed. On the other hand, learning could be more complex. We know, from
the model, that the larger the spillovers, the lower the profitability of R&D cooperation. Hence the
sign of the variable measuring R&D intensity of the industry, if significant, will depend on which of
the two effects mentioned above (lack of property rights or complexity) prevails.
A  variable  which  measures  the  average  sector  share  of  R&D  expenditure  on  sales
(REDINT), is a very noisy index of the public good nature of the firms' capital, as we cannot exclude
that  R&D  industries  could  also  be  extremely  capital  intensive. Pavitt,  1984  provides  a  useful
classification  of industries  into four groups: traditional,  specialised suppliers, scale  intensive and
science based. The science based group isolates industries where knowledge capital is dominating
(PAVITT).
We then move to country specific  variables (Zij).  These include indicators that  proxy the
technological capabilities or, more generally, the level of development, of the country. We know,
from the model, that R&D agreements are less likely to emerge when technological  asymmetries
between  firms are large. Unfortunately, our data base  is extremely  poor in information  about the
firms  undersigning  the  agreements.  It  is  therefore  impossible  to  devise  any  indicator  about
technological capabilities at a firm level. Thus, we must confine ourselves to the use of country level
variables.
The results of the probit are reported in table 4. We just  show the most significant outcomes.
Country data were not available for all the countries considered. Some of the initial observations had
therefore  to be dropped.  Equation  I includes the  largest sample for which  we were able to draw
satisfactory results. The characteristics of the agreement and the nature of the relationship  between
the  partners  are  very  significant.  Indeed,  R&D  contracts  are  more  likely to  emerge  when  the
relationship  between the  partners is non-hierarchical (HIERARcH) and when  it is characterised  by
equity  sharing (EQUITY). The non-hierarchical  nature  of  R&D contracts  supports  the  basic  co-
operative structure assumed in our theoretical model, where both firms contribute to the R&D effort.
At the same time, it shows that local firms must be able to actively interact with the foreign firm in
developing  the  innovation.  The positive  sign  of  the equity  variable  confirms that  contingencies
related  to R&D  are often  too many and  complex  to be  regulated  by  straightforward  arm-length
contracts.  Hence,  first  or  second  best  non  equity  arm  length R&D  contracts  cannot  always  be
26implemented, and thus equity  sharing is an effective sharing rule. This  supports the  sharing rule
assumed in the theory.
The HOVER variable is also very significant, and with a negative sign. As it takes value 0 for
non-market oriented activities, we may infer that, consistently with our assumptions, R&D contracts
are more likely to be implemented in connection with vertical investments, i.e. when R&D aims at
reducing production costs.
The positive and significant coefficient of the Pavitt variable shows that R&D contracts are
likely to  emerge  in  science  based  industries,  i.e.  in  industries  where  knowledge  capital  is  a
dominating firm's asset. The PAVITT variable performed better than REDINT (not shown in the table),
which  is  unable  to  discriminate  industries  with  both  large  tangible  and  intangible  assets  from
industries which  have only intangible assets like R&D and knowledge. Our sample only  includes
agreements and not subsidiaries of multinationals; therefore, it is probably biased towards activities
with  large  spillovers  (the  theoretical  model  predicts  that  arm  length  agreements  emerge  when
spillovers are large). The model also predicts that if spillovers are too large R&D cooperation  is not
viable. Thus, if our results holds, the positive sign of the Pavitt variable implies that, for ranges of
activities with relatively  large spillovers, spillovers are likely to be lower  in knowledge  intensive
industries. Therefore, the effect of learning difficulties seems to dominate  the effect  of ill-defined
property rights on intangible assets.
Two other significant variables measure the level of diffusion of R&D activity  in the host
country.  REDGNP  is the  share of R&D expenditure on GNP  in the country. PERSEC  measures, for
each country, the share of sectors in the sample where there is at least one R&D agreement. In other
words, it measures whether R&D agreements are concentrated in just  one or few specialised sectors,
or whether they  are spread  in the manufacturing sector in general. R&D agreements are therefore
more likely to emerge the larger and the more widely diffused R&D activity in the host country. As
far as country characteristics can proxy firms characteristics, this result confirms the prediction of
the theoretical model:  R&D agreements do not happen when asymmetries  in R&D efficiency  and
R&D investments are too large.
The negative coefficient of WAGE is not easy to explain. As we are considering a sample of
developing countries, and as far as wages do reflect the education level of the labour force, we would
expect R&D to be located in countries with higher average wages (i.e. WAGE to enter with a positive
27Table 4
Probit Estimates
I  Large Sample_2  NICs  Sample
Dependent Variable: R&D  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P> Izi  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>  Zl
cons  -3,152158  0,523168  -6,025  0  -2,935445  0,673914  -4,356  0
equity  0,326194  0,196111  1,663  0,096  0,72641  0,290849  2,498  0,013
hierarch  1,636574  0,186282  8,785  0  1,443977  0,254291  5,678  0
hover  -0,945347  0,214642  -4,404  0  -1,179904  0,272208  -4,335  0
pavitt  0,372248  0,110158  3,379  0,001  0,450809  0,170223  2,648  0,008
persec  1,58837  0,535264  2,967  0,003  - - -
redgdp  32,77965  11,22378  2,921  0,003  29,42076  12,21903  2,408  0,016
subenv  0,170206  0,150653  1,13  0,259  - - -
wage  -0,50919  0,15283  -3,332  0,001
Log Likelihood =  -137,2343  -70,83352  _
Pseudo R2  0,3825  0,4244  _
Number of obs  =  514  269
N. B.
Countries  in  probit  1:  Argentina  Hong Kong  Jamaica  Philippines  Thailand
Brazil  Hungary  S. Korea  Poland  Turkey
China  India  Mexico  Singapore  Venezuela
Egypt  Israel  Pakistan  S.  Africa  Yugoslavia
Countries  in  probit  2:  Hong Kong  S. Korea
Israel  Taiwan
Singaporesign). Probably, this  result is linked to the concentration of R&D contracts in vertical  investments
(where a cheap labour cost is a key determinant).
The theoretical results and probit I  in table 4 support the hypothesis that R&D agreements
are more  likely to emerge when asymmetries are low. These type of agreements would therefore be
more frequent in Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) than in other country, where they are likely
to be subscribed only  in exceptional cases. Indeed, probit 2, which  includes only observations for
five NICs, Hong Kong, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore performs better than probit 1, but
the role played by each variable is roughly unchanged.
4 Conclusions
International dispersion of R&D activity also concems developing countries. Although most
of it is concentrated in the NICs, our data base shows important and considerable exceptions. Indeed,
both  our  theory  and  empirical  evidence  show  that  R&D  can  be  carried  out  via  arm-length
agreements,  even between partners with asymmetric endowments of knowledge.  Thus, developing
countries  firms  are  actively  involved  in  international  R&D,  which  is  not  the  sole  domain  of
subsidiaries of multinational.
This  result takes  us  beyond the  standard framework  applied to the  relationship  between
knowledge  and  technology  transfer.  Multinationals  are  generally  assumed  to  have  an  effective
intemalisation  option,  i.e. if they  want to avoid technological  spillovers  they  set up  subsidiaries
instead  of  (less  costly)  arm-length  agreements.  Hence,  to  prevent  knowledge  spillovers,
multinationals carry out R&D in developing countries with subsidiaries.
In  fact,  subsidiaries  are  not  water  tight.  Spillovers  may  occur  towards  host  country
competitors, or the subsidiaries employees could set up a new company. The only effective way to
internalise  spillovers  is through  agreements which buy  in the  loyalty of the  learning  party.  Our
theory shows that R&D cooperation  is a tool to make these agreements more profitable  and more
stable, as far as it strengthens the bindings and the relationship of trust between the partners.
Spillovers have an ambiguous effect on R&D agreements. They must be sufficiently large to
induce firms to intemalise them through an agreement. But if they are too large the partners have no
28interest in cooperating in R&D, once the agreement is formed. Indeed, when spillovers are very
large, they generate  a transfer  of knowledge  which is almost as large  as under R&D cooperation.
The empirical analysis,  which tests the decision  of cooperating  in R&D once the agreement
is formed (the sample does not include subsidiaries),  supports some of the key assumptions and
results of the theory. R&D agreements  are mostly non-hierarchical:  firms cooperate on an equal
footing base, in  that each partner contributes to  the R&D effort. Such contribution and the
technological  capabilities  of the partners  may differ,  but, as confirmed  by the evidence,  asymmetries
must not be too large. Most R&D agreements  are based in Newly Industrialising  Countries,  which
have relatively  advanced  industrial  bases and capabilities.
We also find significant evidence that most agreements  take place in research intensive
industries,  where knowledge  capital is dominating.  In these industries  spillovers  are likely to be low
(confirming  the predictions  of the theory),  as far as the effects of learning  difficulties  dominate on
the effects of ill-defined  property  rights on knowledge  capital.
29Appendix: background to the empirical analysis
The Merit/Cati Data Base
Our sample has been extracted from Merit/Cati data bank on technological agreements. This
data  bank  concerns  nearly  10.000 agreements  among  firms  located  in more  than  60  countries
established before  1989. The main source of the data is the press, mostly newspapers and business
journals.  Information  about  the existence  of agreements also has been  gathered  from companies'
annual reports and business yearbooks7.
The data bank considers technological co-operative agreements. A technology transfer or a
common  innovative activity  must be  the  aim of  at  least a  relevant  part  of the  agreement.  The
definition  of  co-operative  agreement  utilised  in  the  data  bank  is  "common  interests  between
independent (industrial)  partners which are not connected through (majority) ownership" (Duysters
and  Hagedoorn,  1994). This  broad  definition  includes a  wide range of  contractual  forms8,  from
customer-supplier  relationships and licensing (in which the common interest stems only  from the
royalties the  licensing firm gains from the  licensee's profits) to  more closer form of co-operation
among  totally  independent  partners  like  bidding  consortia, joint  development  agreements, joint
research pacts, or agreements involving equity sharing,  like joint ventures or minority holding.
Constructions of the variables ftrom the data base
We generated  our dependent variable  and a few explanatory variables  by aggregating  the
agreements according to the following criteria. In order to divide the agreements between R&D and
Non-R&D we had to move in two steps. Some of the agreements are obviously of an R&D type;
these  include, joint  research pacts, joint  development  agreements and R&D contracts. In contrast,
bidding consortia and most of all, joint ventures are in a grey zone. To classify the agreements we
looked  at  the  underlying  motives,  among which  we  could easily  identify those  related  to  R&D
activities.
For the variable Hierarch, we once more relied on the definitions of the contractual  forms.
We derived a partition of the agreements into a group of equal footing relationships, in which all the
parties were subject to symmetrical mutual contributions, and a group of unilateral transfers in which
a  hierarchical  relationship  between  customers  and  suppliers  was  recognisable.  For the  variable
Hover, we referred to the variable "distance to the market" of the CATI data bank. We classified as
horizontal all agreements which concern the final market and as vertical otherwise.
7 The Financial  Time Industrial  Companies  Yearbooks  and Dun  & Bradstreet's  "Who  Owns  Whom"
8 For a complete  list of the contractual  forms  used in the CATI  data bank, see Duysters  and Hagedoorn,  1993,
pp. 12-13.
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